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1. This decision was, of course, bitterly criticized by many of the contributors. For many
others, however, especially those who had participated in the wars in 1939–40 and 1941–44,
the accounts were small even nominally, and they felt that more redistribution was needed.
Thus, new and bigger PAYGO pensions were lucrative. The decision was also shadowed by
other urgent economic questions, such as the gradual abolishment of war-related regulations
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Prefunding in a Deﬁned Beneﬁt
Pension System
The Finnish Case
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8.1 Introduction
The pension system of Finland consists of earnings-related pensions
that cover almost all paid work, and a residence-based national pension.
There has been considerable rivalry, even battle, between these two parts,
with the former now the undisputed winner. The Finnish earnings-related
system has some rather unique features: It is statutory by law but largely
privately run, and it has collected funds to smoothe the contribution in-
creases due to aging in the future. Despite the severe challenges caused by
aging, it seems likely that the system will be changed from within, rather
than simply replaced with a new system. It is diﬃcult to foresee, however,
what the changes will be and how the existing funds and future prefunding
will be used.
Under the ﬁrst comprehensive pension arrangement, the 1937 National
Pension Law, the national pension was earnings related. In this arrange-
ment there were personal retirement accounts, which were fully funded.
Contributions began in 1939; but then came the war, inﬂation ate half of
the accounts, and unfunded but indexed supplementary beneﬁts became
dominant. What was left in the personal accounts was never paid to the
contributors,1 but was used instead as starting capital for a new system,
263and the general strike in 1956, which, in itself, prevented the trade unions and employers
from defending the earnings-related accounts in unison.
enacted by the 1956 National Pension Law. The views of the rural popula-
tion dominated, and the national pension became a means-tested, ﬂat-
rate pension.
The Employees’ Pensions Act (TEL) came into force on 1 July 1962.
It was created during negotiations between trade unions and employers’
organizations, and supported politically by social democrats and conser-
vative parties. To reduce political risks, administration was given to several
private pension institutes. During the 1960s there were attempts in the
form of law initiatives to combine TEL with the national pension system,
but they failed to receive a majority. TEL is now by far the largest private-
sector pension system in Finland, and has served as a model for several
other earnings-related systems in that country.
After the 1960s, the growing importance of an increasingly united trade
union movement was further reﬂected in the relative roles of the earnings-
related and national pension systems (see Niemela ¨ 1994). The former be-
came the dominant pension arrangement, and plans to develop the na-
tional pension into a universal retirement provision, without means test-
ing, were abolished.
This article proceeds as follows. Section 8.2 contains a description of
the main features of the Finnish pension systems, and section 8.3 describes
the current situation and future prospects. Section 8.4 discusses the re-
forms made during the last decade. Recent policy proposals are surveyed
in section 8. 5. Section 8.6 concludes with some views on future changes.
8.2 The Present Old Age Pension System in Finland
The Finnish pension system consists of two main parts: The earnings-
related pension system aims to provide retirement income suﬃcient for
consumption comparable both to that of working years and to current
workers’ consumption. The national pension guarantees a minimum in-
come in cases where the earnings-related pension is absent or insuﬃcient.
Both systems are mandatory. Voluntary pensions, whether employer-based
or industry-wide supplementary pensions or personal pension arrange-
ments, are of minor importance in Finland.
8.2.1 Statutory Earnings-Related Pension
The statutory earnings-related pension covers almost all paid work. It
covers risks related to old age, disability, long-term unemployment of aging
workers, and death of family earners.
Every employment contract and self-employment period adds to the
264 Jukka Lassila and Tarmo Valkonen2. There is no speciﬁed target for the share that is funded. Before 1997, funding between
the ages of twenty-three and ﬁfty-four was “full,” in the sense that, had there been no wage
inﬂation, the 5 percent nominal yield requirement of the funds would have resulted in funds
suﬃcient to pay out (with no PAYGO ﬁnancing) exactly the amount of beneﬁts one had
accrued between the ages of twenty-three and ﬁfty-four. Needless to say, there was inﬂation
both in prices and in wages, and funding was far from full. The changes made in 1997 (de-
scribed later) were calibrated so that the required funding would stay at the prevailing level;
0.5 percent is a result of that calibration.
pension (after age twenty-three). The pensionable wage is aggregated over
the last ten years of each contract. The accrued pension right is vested,
even when the worker is changing employers or stopping work.
The target level of beneﬁts is 60 percent of wages. This accrues in about
forty years: 1.5 percent per year between ages twenty-three and ﬁfty-nine
and 2.5 percent per year between sixty and sixty-ﬁve. There is no upper
absolute limit to beneﬁts, but an upper percentage limit is 60 percent of
the highest pensionable earnings. Pensions accrued under diﬀerent systems
are integrated. The disability pension is projected to the retirement age.
Pension rights and beneﬁts are index-linked, with 50–50 weights on wages
and consumer prices, respectively, during working years and 20–80
weights after age sixty-ﬁve.
Contributions are collected from both employers (16.8 percent of wages
in 2000) and employees (4.7 percent). Future changes have been agreed to
be shared equally between employers and employees (see ﬁgs. 8.1 and 8.2).
The private-sector earnings-related system is partially funded. Funding
is collective but based on individual pension rights. Currently, the main
prefunding rules are as follows:
● Old age pensions. A part of old age pension beneﬁts, payable after age
sixty-ﬁve, is funded for each employee. Funding takes place between
ages twenty-three and ﬁfty-four, so only beneﬁts accrued during those
years are (partially) funded. The degree of funding is below one-third.2
Of the 1.5 percent (of wage income) pension right accruing every year
between the ages of twenty-three and 54, 0.5 percent is funded. The
present value of accrued rights is calculated using a 3 percent discount
rate. No funding is done for beneﬁt increases due to indexation. Sev-
eral additional detailed assumptions and rules are used to calculate
the amount to be put in the fund.
● Disability pensions. Funding takes place when the case occurs. Fund-
ing was full for large ﬁrms, but beginning in 2000 the maximum
funded share is 80 percent. The disability pension is paid, and funded,
only until age sixty-ﬁve. After that the pensioner receives the old age
pension. Again, no funding is done for beneﬁt increases due to index-
ation. Similar funding rules apply to the unemployment pensions.
● Both. The rate of return also aﬀects the size of the fund; see section
8.2.3.






























































































































.The funds are collective: Individual pension beneﬁts do not depend on the
existence or yield of funds. Funds aﬀect contributions only. When a person
receives pensions after the age of sixty-ﬁve, his or her funds are used to
pay that part of the pension beneﬁt that was prefunded. The rest comes
from the pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) part, the so-called “pooled component”
in the contribution rate.
The statutory earnings-related system was created in cooperation with
labor market organizations, which are represented in the administrative
bodies. The administration is decentralized among several pension insti-
tutes. The largest of these are private pension insurance companies and
the Local Government Pensions Institution. These institutes collect the
contributions, pay the pensions, and invest the retained funds. The Central
Pension Security Institute maintains the central register, compiles statis-
tics, and redistributes among the other institutions the pooled component
of contributions collected in the private pension scheme.
The labor market organizations occupy at least half of the seats in the
administrative bodies of the pension institutes. They also negotiate with
the representatives of the central government about the future develop-
ment of the pension scheme.
The earnings-related pensions in the public sector are very similar to
those in the private sector, described above. The amount of annual fund-
ing, however, is discretionary and is not formally based on any formula
concerning accrued pension rights or future expenditures. The Local Gov-
ernment Pensions Institution, handling the earnings-related pensions for
municipal employees, has funds amounting to 137 percent of the sector’s
annual wage bill in 1999, roughly comparable to the TEL system. The
pension fund of the central government is still small, but there is an
agreement to raise the funding rate to the same level as in the private sector
by the year 2010 (table 8.1 describes the distribution of pension fund assets
among the general groups).
8.2.2 National Pension
The residence-based national pension guarantees a minimum pension
to those without a suﬃcient earnings-related pension. The beneﬁts also
include survivors’ pensions for widows, widowers, and children, housing
allowances, care allowances, and veterans’ supplements. The beneﬁts are
indexed to consumer prices. The national pension system is administered
by the Social Insurance Institution (Kela), under the supervision of Par-
liament.
Before 1996, the basic national pension amount was paid to all pension-
ers over sixty-ﬁve years of age. For new retirees whose earnings-related
pensions exceed a certain limit, a national pension is no longer paid, and
for those retired before 1996 with a similar earnings-related pension, the
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ished in 2001.
8.2.3 Experiences from the Finnish Prefunded Deﬁned Beneﬁt System
The main justiﬁcation oﬃcially presented for partial prefunding was to
alleviate the burden due to the aging baby boom generation. The expressed
aim was to use the funds to lower the projected peak in the contribution
rate. The current population forecasts imply, however, that there will be no
marked reduction in pension expenditures after the large cohorts have
died. This has created a situation in which there is no general agreement
about the future funding rates.
The original reason for funding, however, was not necessarily to serve
as a precautionary tool for future aging. Short-term tactical considerations
may well have dominated. Employers’ representatives could have favored
partial funding for two reasons: First, it provided a way to have low actual
contributions initially. Unions demanded higher pensions immediately,
which would have meant high contributions. Funding allowed raising con-
tributions with only small liquidity eﬀects, because ﬁrms were entitled to
borrow back most of the funded part of contributions. Second, in the after-
math of the 1956 National Pension Law, there were fears of a political
takeover of the earnings-related pension system. Employers thought that
trade unions would be more willing to defend the TEL system when there
was money in the funds. That turned out to be correct: Even though social-
ists and communists in general favored national pensions, in trade unions
they—along with social democrats—supported TEL.
During the ﬁrst twenty-ﬁve years of the pension scheme, the allocation
and even the yield of the funds were strictly regulated. The Insurance
Companies Act and the instructions given by the Ministry of Social
Aﬀairs and Health restricted the risk content of portfolios by determining
how assets with various risk characteristics were considered in the solvency
calculations. These regulations were not, however, the most binding. The
portfolio allocation was dominated by the privilege of ﬁrms to borrow
most of the contributions paid. These premium loans were guaranteed
Table 8.1 Assets of Pension Funds in 1999
Amount (in euros) In Relation to GDP
Private sector 52.4 43
Local government 11.7 10
Central government 2.8 2
Total 67.0 55
Sources: Authors’ tabulations from various databases.
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assets when inﬂation was subdued.
mostly by banks and were therefore risk free for the pension institutions.
The justiﬁcation expressed for the low interest rate premium loans was to
give preference to the strengthening of the contribution base by promot-
ing investments.
The role of the Bank of Finland as a regulator of monetary and currency
policy was also important. The direct methods to aﬀect the pension fund
portfolios were to give instructions for lending, to agree with the pension
institutions about the lending rate, and to restrict foreign investments to
an insigniﬁcant amount. Indirectly, the regulations of the central bank and
the capital income tax code ensured that the domestic ﬁnancial markets
remained undeveloped and that savings were transmitted from households
and the public sector to ﬁrms almost totally by promissory note loans. The
control of lending rates, together with the high inﬂation rate, also lowered
the real rate of return of the pension funds. Because part of the nominal
yield was distributed back to employers in the form of lower contributions,
the actual real yield aﬀecting the size of the prefunded amount was nega-
tive until the year 1983.
After the liberalization of ﬁnancial markets at the end of the 1980s, the
real interest rate rose in the economy. The demand for loans decreased and
the markets of other assets boomed. During the recession in the beginning
of 1990s it became evident that the regulatory rules were not in line with
the new investment environment. The solvency of the pension institutions
was too weak to beneﬁt the higher yield of the growing markets fully.
The investment regulations were amended according to the life assur-
ance directive when Finland joined the European Union (EU; Tuomisto
1999). Another important decision was to join the Economic and Mone-
tary Union (EMU), which allowed international diversiﬁcation of invest-
ments without breaking the rules of uncovered currency positions. The
pension system was nevertheless slow to react to the new investment envi-
ronment, and it was not until 1997 that the new prefunding rules allowed
more risky portfolio allocation.3 In between, there has been a very favor-
able trend in stock markets, which has not been utilized until lately. The
reform reduced the minimum rate of return on the funds and directed
extra funds to the solvency margin of the pension institutions for three
years. The impacts of the new rules and the growth of stock market prices
have raised the share of domestic and foreign stocks in the private-sector
pension fund portfolios from 11.9 percent in 1997 to 27.7 percent in 1999.
The new prefunding rules of the old age pensions can be described as
follows. The funded component of the pension contribution is determined
so as to give the individual a pension right of 0.5 percent of his or her
yearly earnings between ages twenty-three and ﬁfty-four. In the calculation
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amount yields nominal interest rate of 3 percent. The impacts of inﬂation
and the growth of wages to the ﬁnal pension are not considered. The actual
funding is supported by transferring the investment yield corresponding to
the TEL-calculated interest rate (5.75 percent in 2000) to the individual’s
account. The TEL-calculated interest rate is the required rate of return on
the invested funds and is determined by the Ministry of Social Aﬀairs
and Health. A working group is currently reconsidering whether this yield
requirement should be linked to some combination of ﬁnancial market in-
dexes.
If the yield of the assets is higher than the TEL-calculated interest rate,
the pension institution can either use the funds to strengthen its solvency
or distribute the surplus to customer employers. The new solvency rules
set both a minimum zone and a target zone for solvency. The higher the
risks in the portfolio, the higher the required position inside the zone. If
solvency of an institution falls below the target zone, the opportunities to
distribute the surplus yield to employers are limited.
The supervisory board of a pension fund, in which the social partners
are represented, is obliged to draft an investment plan and to supervise
its implementation. This plan deﬁnes the aims of the investment policy,
including, for example, the targeted average yield, diversiﬁcation, and the
security of assets and their convertibility into money. The fund’s aims must
be in line with the rules outlined in the relevant paragraphs of the Insur-
ance Companies Act. In practice, the investment departments of pension
funds have many degrees of freedom to operate within the given limits.
The portfolio shares at the end of 1999 were roughly as follows: 41 percent
in bonds, 28 percent in stocks, nearly 10 percent in both money market
instruments and real estate, and the remainder in investment and pre-
mium loans.
The importance of prefunding to the pension system can be evaluated
by noting that according to the recent forecasts, when the funds are stabi-
lized at their equilibrium level around the year 2050, the yield will lower
the private-sector contribution rate by 5 percentage points. This calcula-
tion assumes that the real rate of return on the pension fund assets is
3 percent.
Assuming that the incidence of employers’ contributions has been
mainly on labor, the mandatory prefunding has increased total saving and
thereby investments as well. The eﬃciency of resource allocation was,
however, subject to doubts during the period of strict regulation. Since
the liberalization and development of ﬁnancial markets, the allocation has
improved, but the savings-investment link has lost its importance in the
small open economy. Nevertheless, the beneﬁcial impacts of saving on na-
tional wealth and on the intergenerational distribution of the aging bur-
den remain.
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The overall prospects of the current Finnish pension system are domi-
nated by rapid aging. The ratio of the population aged sixty and older to
that aged twenty to ﬁfty-nine is expected to increase from the current 0.35
to 0.66 in 2030. The stochastic population simulations of Alho (1998) chal-
lenge even this gloomy base scenario. These simulations, based on previ-
ous forecasting errors in fertility, mortality, and migration, show that un-
certainty is higher than usually recognized. The 80 percent conﬁdence
interval of the age dependency ratio is 0.61–0.79 in 2030. The lower limit
(0.61) results mostly from nonincreasing life expectancy, and the upper
limit (0.79) from declining fertility and emigration.
The age dependency ratio does not comprehensively describe the ratio
of pensioners to employees. The other often-used measure is the economic
dependency ratio, which takes into account labor market conditions. Sev-
eral contradictory trends aﬀect the future labor force participation rate in
Finland. First is the expected reduction in the unemployment rate from
the current level of 9 percent. Another is the already high female participa-
tion rate, which does not allow much potential for improvement. Yet an-
other is the fact that the average retirement age, although expected to rise
somewhat, is as low as ﬁfty-nine years and only 10 percent of each cohort
retire at the statutory retirement age of sixty-ﬁve years.
Furthermore, the pension system is still maturing. The ﬁrst employees
in the private sector have just reached the right to retire with full pension
(after contributing for the required number of years to the system), and it
will take approximately thirty years until this is possible for all pensioners.
There are also two features that postpone the eﬀects of the beneﬁcial
impacts of the recent reforms on pension expenditures. The ﬁrst is the
generous grandfathering rule followed in the reforms. Although most of
the privileges in the public-sector scheme were abolished, it was decided
that the new, higher retirement age (from sixty-three to sixty-ﬁve years)
apply fully to the new entrants of this scheme only. Second, the likely posi-
tive impacts of a higher return on pension funds, facilitated by the 1997
reform, are not reﬂected in contributions until the corresponding cohorts
retire.
The Central Pension Security Institute calculates long-term scenarios
primarily for the private-sector scheme, but also for the public-sector pen-
sions and the national pensions. The latest is published in Klaavo et al.
(1999). According to the baseline scenario, the ratio of all pension expen-
ditures to GDP rises from 11.7 percent in 1998 to 16.4 percent in 2034.
After that the ratio declines somewhat due to the means testing of the
basic pensions, the passing away of the baby boom generation, and the
growth of income. The average private-sector pension contribution rate
272 Jukka Lassila and Tarmo Valkonenrises from the current 21.5 percent of wages to 32 percent in 2050. During
the same period, the private-sector pension funds rise from 132 percent of
the corresponding total wage bill to 250 percent in 2050.
Lassila and Valkonen (2000b) show that this baseline scenario is very
sensitive to demographics. If the previously mentioned upper-limit (0.79)
scenario of the conﬁdence interval of the age ratio is followed, the private-
sector contribution rate exceeds 50 percent in 2060. Scenarios with diﬀer-
ent assumptions exist in abundance. Increasing the retirement age by one
year lowers the contribution rate by 1.5–2.0 percentage points.A1p e r c e n t
rise in the rate of return on the existing funds would lower (in the short
term) the contribution rate by 1.3 percentage points. In the long term, the
corresponding reduction would be 2.5 percentage points. If the growth
rate in productivity and real wages is 2.0 percent, instead of the baseline
assumption of 1.5 percent, the ratio of pension expenditures to wages will
decline more than 2 percentage points in the long run (Klaavo et al. 1999).
The contribution rate would decline by half of that amount under current
funding rules.
8.4 Recent Reforms
Until the severe recession in the beginning of the 1990s, the trend in
pension reforms was to raise the beneﬁt level and to loosen the rules for
eligibility to early pensions. The recession created an urgent need to cut
labor costs both in the private and in the public sector and emphasized
the problems of long-term sustainability of the pension system. In addition
to the necessary expenditure cuts, the following reforms were aimed at
several other objectives, such as a more stable ratio of pension expendi-
tures to total wages during business cycles, a higher actual retirement age,
and a higher yield on pension funds.
The ﬁrst policy reaction was to introduce the employees’ pension contri-
bution and to agree that future hikes in the contribution rate would be
divided 50–50 between the employers and employees. Furthermore, the
generous beneﬁt rules of the public-sector pension system were scaled
down in line with those prevailing in the private sector. Later, the pension
beneﬁts were cut by tightening several times the rules for early retirement
and by introducing a bent pension index. In the bent index, the weight of
earnings is smaller and the weight of consumption prices larger after age
sixty-ﬁve.
The introduction of the bent index implies that the discussed possibility
of using the index system as means of adjusting the expenditures to varia-
tions in total wages was ruled out and that preference was given to expen-
diture cuts. The objective of dampening the impacts of business cycles was
not, however, totally rejected. The labor market parties agreed in 1997 on
Prefunding in a Deﬁned Beneﬁt System: Finland 273the introduction of buﬀer funds both in the unemployment insurance sys-
tem and in the private pension system. The special buﬀer reserve in the
pension system is about 2.5 percent of the corresponding total wages.
Another major reform during the latter part of the decade was a shift
in the funding rules. The separation of pension contribution determination
from the same-period yield of the pension funds provided an opportunity
f o ram o r ee ﬃcient portfolio allocation. Because the funding rate in the
new system depends partly on the yield of the investments, the real value
of the assets can be sheltered more eﬃciently from inﬂation than in the
old ﬁxed interest rate system. This becomes true if the TEL-calculated
interest rate follows market rates.
There is a wide consensus that workers should not retire as early as they
now do. The average retirement age is currently somewhat below sixty
years. For instance, the current government aims to increase the average
age of exit from the labor force by two to three years in the long term.
There is a National Program on Aging Workers for the years 1998–2002,
organized by the ministries of social aﬀairs and health, labor, and educa-
tion, aiming to help older workers to stay in work. The measures include
increasing the physical and mental condition of aged workers, designing
speciﬁc services to be provided by employment agencies, and in general
making attitudes more favorable to elderly workers. Moreover, the eco-
nomic incentives to retire early have been reduced, as discussed above.
These reforms have had a profound impact on the pension expenditure
scenarios. Table 8.2 summarizes the main features of the Finnish pension
reforms. Table 8.3 presents in more detail the contributions of the various
reforms to the total 8.4 percentage point cut in expenditures in the long
term.
8.5 Proposals and Discussion
8.5.1 Employers’ Proposed Reduction in Contributions
Although there seems to be no disagreement about the necessity to raise
the contribution rate in the future, a serious discussion concerning whether
to decrease the current rate for a few years has emerged. The employer
side proposed a reduction in the fall of 1999. The size of the measure for
the year 2000 was not speciﬁed, but it could have been about one percent-
age point.
The proposed cut is based on two things. First, the cut could be seen
simply as a result of following current rules. There is room for the contribu-
tion decrease because the EMU buﬀer stock fund target (2.5 percent of
the respective annual wage bill), agreed upon in 1997, has been reached
more quickly than originally planned. Second, if the reduction would not
immediately result in wage increases of equal magnitude, labor costs











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































n4. Palme argues against means testing, but the same arguments can be used against pen-
sion ceilings.
would be lower and the still-sizeable rate of unemployment could be re-
duced. This would also beneﬁt the pension system.
The employee representatives have opposed the cut. Trade unions be-
lieve that the inevitable sharp increase in contributions, after the few years
with lower rates, would strengthen the case for beneﬁt reductions. The rate
reduction did not take place for the year 2000. Instead, the social partners
agreed that the need for funding shall be assessed before the rates are re-
duced. The issue reappeared in the fall of 2000, and the social partners
agreed to suggest to the Ministry of Social Aﬀairs and Health a cut of 0.4
percentage points. These suggestions are seldom turned down.
8.5.2 Ceiling for Pensions
An absolute ceiling for earnings-related pensions is recurrently, al-
though not often, suggested for both cost-saving and distributive reasons.
The system responds by saying that the ceiling would increase private vol-
untary arrangements, which would increase total costs. The eﬀects of a
pension ceiling on income distribution may also be counterintuitive. Palme
(1999) shows that although the distribution of pensions in Finland is very
wide in international comparison, the overall distribution of pensioners’
income is one of the narrowest in Europe. He contrasts the Finnish case
to those of countries that try to narrow the distribution of public pensions,
thus leaving more room for the private pensions market and eventually
having a more uneven distribution in total income.4 High-income earners
in Finland are satisﬁed with the current earnings-related pension system
because it has no ceiling, and resort to private arrangements only to a
minor degree.
Table 8.3 The Expenditure Impacts of the Main Pension Policy Measures (1990s)
Change in
Measure Implementation Expendituresa
Surviving spouses’ pensions 1990 0.8
Public-sector pensions 1993 2.7
Eligibility ages 1994 0.7
Pensionable wages 1996 0.4
Accrual rate for the post-contingency period 1996 1.5
Bent index 1996 1.5
Means testing of national pension 1996 0.8
Total 8.4
Source: Central Pension Security Institute (1999).
aAs percent of total wages in 2030.
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Pension beneﬁts are index-linked to both wages and consumer prices.
After age sixty-ﬁve a bent index is used: The weight of earnings in the
pension index is reduced from 0.5 to 0.2 and the weight of consumption
prices increased from 0.5 to 0. 8. This “bending” reduces the increase in
beneﬁts that results from rising real wages. The bent index was introduced
in 1996 and remains a disputed political issue. Pensioners’ organizations
speak of age discrimination and create political pressure, but their eﬀorts
seem unlikely to change matters. A law initiative was signed by 155 of the
200 members of Parliament in 1997, aimed at abolishing the bent index
and returning to the use of a halfway index for all pensioners. Although
there seemed to be a clear majority, Parliament managed with little diﬃ-
culty to postpone the issue, and the initiative was automatically dismissed
when a new Parliament was elected in 1999. The cost-saving eﬀect of the
bent index, compared to that of the halfway index, is about 1.5 percent of
total wages (see table 8.3).
8.5.4 The Active Population’s Share
Administrators of the pension systems argue that increasing pension
expenditures and rising contributions will not necessarily be a problem.
An oft-used argument is that the increase in productivity will probably be
rapid enough to allow the living standards of the working-age population
to increase, despite the growing share of the elderly. The opponents argue
that growth in incomes does not necessarily make high contribution rates
any more attractive.
8.5.5 Propositions by Hautala and Tuukkanen
The main ideas of the pension reform suggested by Hautala and Tuuk-
kanen (1999) are to strengthen the link between pension contributions and
beneﬁts, to reduce the options for early retirement pensions, and to intro-
duce an individual pension account for middle-aged workers. In the pro-
posed pension scheme, old age pension contributions are paid entirely by
employees, beneﬁts are based on paid contributions, the retirement age is
ﬂexible, and early retirement reduces pensions actuarially. The system is
ﬁnanced mainly by the PAYGO principle until age ﬁfty-four. After that,
the employee moves to a fully funded, deﬁned contribution pension
scheme. The funds in the accounts are invested collectively, which reduces
risks and administrative costs. The transition to the new individual ac-
count system requires little new ﬁnancing because the labor force partici-
pation rate in that age group is low. The average retirement age is expected
to rise markedly due to the improved incentives and due to the abolition
of the current unemployment pension system. The reform is aimed at in-
creasing eﬃciency and equity in both the earnings-related pension scheme
and the unemployment insurance system.
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The Lundqvist (1999) proposition takes as a starting point the diver-
siﬁed needs and the willingness of individuals to secure their old age
incomes. Therefore, employees should be able to get information contin-
uously about the amount of accrued pension entitlements in both the
mandatory and voluntary schemes. The created information system also
would make the links between contributions and beneﬁts more transpar-
ent. According to the proposition, it is also necessary to enhance the possi-
bilities to save for old age outside the earnings-related pension scheme.
8.5.7 Simpliﬁcation of the Pension System
Representatives of the pension institutions and labor-market parties are
currently discussing a package of measures aiming to simplify the pension
system and to foster its transparency. The initiative for the reform can be
traced back to the present government’s program. Most of the issues in
this discussion have already come up some time earlier. The main ideas
are to improve the link between beneﬁts and contributions and to simplify
the administration of the overall pension system by unifying the rules of
various private-sector pension schemes. In more detail, the proposed
changes are to unify the accrual rate from age eighteen to age sixty-ﬁve to
be 1.5 percent of corresponding wages; to use the wages of the whole work-
ing career to determine the pensionable wage; and the link the amount of
early retirement pensions to the length of the working career. The initial
idea is to implement the reform so that it does not change the amount of
future expenditures. The adjusting variable is possibly indexation during
working age, which could be made more generous because the other ele-
ments of the reform generate savings.
The outcome of the preliminary discussions is unclear because, even
though industrial workers support the ideas, clerical workers and others
with long employment records or with seniority rules in wage determina-
tion (or both) are against some of the proposed changes.
8.5.8 Adjustment of the Beneﬁts and Prefunding
as a Reaction to Demographic Trends
The reformed Swedish pension system reduces pension beneﬁts if life
expectancy increases. The updated Finnish population forecasts assume
that life expectancy will continue to rise for several decades, implying
higher pension expenditures. These two starting points have generated a
discussion about whether the Finnish pension system should adopt a simi-
lar life expectancy adjustment (see Lindell 1999).
Another suggestion is to link the prefunded amount of contributions in
Finland to current birth rates. This idea is based on the observation that,
from the point of view of pension expenditures, uncertainty about future
birth rates is much more important than uncertainty about longevity.
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birth rate is necessary (see Lassila and Valkonen 1999). The corresponding
adjustment on the beneﬁts side could be, for example, indexation of the
pensions to total wages (see Lassila and Valkonen 2000a).
8.6 Conclusions
The statutory earnings-related pension system has a strong position in
Finland. It is generally accepted and widely supported. Besides its basic
role of providing retirement income, it gives economic power to labor mar-
ket organizations. It is ﬂexible in the sense that changes have been (and
are) made often. Its ﬁnancial position is good in international comparison,
due especially to partial prefunding and the high yield on these funds in
recent years.
The other main part of the Finnish pension system, the national pen-
sion, also has an undisputed role. It provides basic subsistence for those
with insuﬃcient or no earnings-related pension. Thus, it is clearly second-
ary to the earnings-related pension. Its size may diminish relatively in the
future, depending on how the concept of “basic subsistence” will be inter-
preted politically.
It seems likely that in the future, reforms will be made within current
systems rather than through the establishment of new systems. The devel-
opments in the 1990s have created conﬁdence that changes can be made
when required. On the other hand, this positive attitude may reduce pre-
cautionary and far-sighted policies such as increasing prefunding.
Voluntary pensions have only a small role in Finland at this time. It is
likely that supplementary pensions will become more common. This may
have far-reaching consequences, because TEL cannot oﬀer many choices
even if in the future it would like to, due to EU competition rules. TEL is
now an accepted exception in competition, but probably cannot expand
the limits. Within TEL, more eﬃciency is sought.
Contributions will rise in the future. Although prefunding makes the
Finnish position better than that of many European countries facing the
aging problem, it may be that the contribution increase required to keep
current beneﬁt promises are deemed too high. The question, then, is how
much and in which way the beneﬁts will be reduced.
Partial pension funding has increased the domestic saving rate, thereby
contributing markedly to the relatively high investment rate in Finland.
However, the previous investment policy of the funds, which was linked to
the then-strongly regulated ﬁnancial system, may not have reached the
standards of eﬃcient resource allocation. Furthermore, the real yield gen-
erated by the funds was negative during the periods of high inﬂation rates.
Furthermore, adjustment to the new investment environment has been
slow. Therefore, the possible beneﬁts of a virtuous circle of increasing
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yields were largely missed. With better coordination of ﬁnancial market
liberalization and reforms in solvency regulations and other investment
rules, the pension funds could have profoundly contributed to the develop-
ment of ﬁnancial markets. Currently, there is no lack of ﬁnancial resources
in the small open economy; therefore the saving-investment link is weaker.
The existing pension funds use modern investment-allocation methods
and the funds’ yields follow the market indexes rather closely.
One of the future challenges of the system is how to increase competi-
tion while ensuring the long-term solvency of the institutions. There are
positive returns to scale in both the insurance and investment operations,
which tends to lead to centralization. At the moment, the main means of
competition is the repayment of pension contributions to the customer
ﬁrms, facilitated by successful investment policy. If the smaller institutions
cannot keep up in the competition, they will lose customers. Another re-
lated challenge is how to determine the minimum required rate of return
on investments so that it is as high as possible, while still leaving room for
as u ﬃcient number of institutions to survive and develop.
Appendix
Old Age Pension Prefunding Rules in the TEL System
We ﬁrst describe the prefunding of the average employee’s future old age
pension beneﬁts, and how the fund is run down in the retirement age. Then
we aggregate to the total population level and give a simpliﬁed presenta-
tion of the dynamics of total funds, the mechanism of contribution deter-
mination, and the use of the yield of funds.
Prefunding at the Individual Level
Every year, a new pension right accrues for each worker, and a part of
the present value of the right is prefunded. For someone already retired,
part of the money prefunded in his or her working years is used to pay a
part of his or her pension. Equations (1) and (2), below, describe these
funding rules for the average worker and pensioner in each age group i in
period t. The gross labor income of the average worker in age group i is
denoted by g.
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According to equation (1), a share a of the present value of the pension
right accruing in period t to workers aged twenty-three to ﬁfty-four is put
in the funds. The present value includes all old age pension years from
sixty-ﬁve to a maximum age denoted by M. The labor income g creates a
pension right for each year from age sixty-ﬁve onward. For prefunding pur-
poses, the magnitude of this right is evaluated ignoring all future changes
due to wage or price developments. Thus the value of the right is simply
kg for each retirement year. Currently, k is 1.5 percent.
The discount factor includes both an interest rate and survival probabili-
ties. The fund rate of interest, used in this calculation, is administratively
set. We denoted it by rh. The term S in equation (1) describes the expected
eﬀects of mortality. Only a share S of those in age group i in period t are
expected to be alive in age j.
Equation (2) states that, for a retired person, the amount prefunded ear-
lier (when the current pensioner was between ages twenty-three and ﬁfty-
four) for periods t’s pension, and the interest accrued to those funds, is
used to pay a part of the person’s pension (the rest comes from the PAYGO
part). The interest accrued is calculated using another administratively set
interest rate, the so-called TEL-calculated interest rate (assumed constant
here for a simpler exposition).
Equations (1) and (2) are, in practice, interesting only to pension compa-
nies because they are used in calculating the companies’ pension liabilities.
Each company is responsible for the prefunded parts of the pensions of
those insured in the company. The companies are jointly responsible for
the rest of the pensions. Of course, the equations are also important for
the aggregate dynamics of the pension system, especially for the level and
the time path of the contribution rate.
Aggregate Pension Funds and the Contribution Rate
The total amount of new funding in period t is obtained by multiplying
the average individual funding in age group i, described in equation (1),
by the number of workers n in the age group, and summing over all age
groups. This is done in equation (3). The total amount withdrawn from
funds is obtained analogously (equation [4]). Two other aggregates are de-
ﬁned in equations (5) and (6): the total wage bill, from which the pension
contributions are collected, and the total amount of old age earnings-
related pension expenditure, where the average individual pensions are de-
noted by z.
























The dynamics of the total amount of funds, H, follow from equation (7),
and the contribution rate is determined as a residual from equation (8).
(7)
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The employer’s contribution rate (l) and the employee’s contribution rate
(e) must bring receipts suﬃcient to cover the part of pension expenditure
that does not come from withdrawals from funds, plus new funding. The
employer’s contribution rate is higher than the employee’s, but they move
hand in hand.
Actually, employers usually pay less than the nominal contribution rate.
If the actual yield on funds exceeds the TEL-calculated interest rate, the
diﬀerence is paid back to the employers. This yield diﬀerence varies among
pension companies and is the main factor in their competition for custom-
ers, which are ﬁrms and other employers providing pension insurance for
their workers. The employer’s ex post contribution rate  ˆ l is determined
according to equation (9).
(9)
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The presentation above is still simpliﬁed. We have ignored disability and
unemployment pensions and the funds related to them, and other transfers
the pension system pays.
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Comment Reijo Vanne
Jukka Lassila and Tarmo Valkonen have done pioneering work on models
of overlapping generations in the Finnish economy. The sustainability and
intergenerational eﬀects of the pension system have been among their sub-
jects of research. During the course of their work, they have acquired a
profound knowledge of the Finnish pension system, and I regard their text
as a good description of both the system and its problems, and of the
reform proposals presented. Below, I will introduce a few additional
points, mainly on the history of the ideas and arguments behind the pres-
ent system.
Although the Finnish earnings-related pension system is based on
agreement among the social partners, it has formally been statutory from
the very beginning. However, private companies and funds run the
schemes. In the national accounts, the pension institutions and their assets
are nowadays included in the general government ﬁgures. Nevertheless,
pension funds make their own decentralized investment decisions, like any
other private funds.
Pension reform ideas and their acceptance have typically come up in
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Reijo Vanne is chief economist at the Central Pension Security Institute in Helsinki, Fin-
land.negotiations among representatives of the social partners. Technically, the
design of the system has been the responsibility of mathematicians and
lawyers; economists have played a minor role.
Before the 1990s, the driving forces behind reforms were concepts of the
Nordic-type welfare state. During the 1990s, these forces were, as the au-
thors state, the recession and a growing awareness of an aging population.
The Original Ideas of an Original System
The authors oﬀer a good presentation of the history of the Finnish pen-
sion system, which consists of the national and the earnings-related pen-
sion schemes. However, some of the ﬁrst ideas of the earnings-related sys-
tem and contemporary conditions may be worth mentioning. The
committee that designed the prefunded deﬁned beneﬁt pension system
worked from 1956 to 1960 under the chairmanship of Professor Teivo Pen-
tika ¨inen (Report of the Pension Committee 1960).
The topical problem that had to be solved was poor and high-risk living
standards in old age and in the event of disability. I suppose this was the
reason behind the two main features of the plan. First, it was not possible
to wait for decades until the ﬁrst suﬃciently high beneﬁts could be paid.
This fact recommended a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) solution. Second, the
designers emphasized that the fundamental purpose of a pension plan is
to guarantee a targeted living standard after retirement. This view recom-
mended a deﬁned beneﬁt system.
The committee also dealt with the issue of intergenerational distribution
in the spirit of overlapping generations and possible political majorities
in the future. It stated that a fully funded system would not sustain any
intergenerational redistribution or political tension. Rather, the long tran-
sition period and the committee’s view of the risks of the fund returns led
them to recommend only partial funding. Inﬂation was regarded as the
main threat to the real value of the funds. This view should be understood
against a background of the regulated markets of that time. Also, thoughts
related to the later Aaron’s principle (Aaron 1966) were presented. The
workforce would be expanding in future years due to the baby boomers,
although the total fertility rate was declining rapidly.
Lassila and Valkonen state that prefunding is oﬃcially seen as a vehicle
for smoothing the eﬀects of baby boom generations on contribution rates.
It is true that a couple of common views in Finland during, say, the last
twenty-ﬁve years have been that prefunding is due to baby boomers and
that funding should be a transitory phase. In spite of increasing longevity
(which has either materialized or is expected) and other factors that rec-
ommend continued prefunding, this view is still widely shared in Finland,
although not among experts. However, the baby boomer problem was not
originally the main argument for partial prefunding, and nowadays better
arguments are clearly available again.
The committee noted that no decent market for voluntary pension
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tion in a PAYGO system may make later generations withdraw from the
system. It therefore recommended a statutory scheme.
The Main Reforms before the 1990s
The real growth rate of the Finnish economy was fairly high in the 1960s
and 1970s. The working-age population, productivity, and the wage sum
were growing rapidly. There seemed to be room for a rise in the living
standard of the elderly. The targeted replacement ratio was raised from 40
to 60 percent in 1975. Naturally, this had to be done by lowering the fund-
ing rate and by increasing the PAYGO part of the implicit liabilities. At
the time of the decision, a few peaks and valleys had just been reached:
an all-time low in the fertility rate, and all-time high in the growth rate for
human capital in terms of expected real earnings due to the age structure,
and a bottoming-out of relative oil prices. It appeared that the target level
was too ambitious. The contribution level more than doubled in the 1970s,
and the index link between pension beneﬁts and accrued rights to the real
wage level was reduced to 50 percent from the former 100 percent.
Rapid economic growth and changes in economic structure resulted in
depreciation of the skills of aging workers in certain industries. The educa-
tional level of the older generations was very poor compared with that of
younger generations. I suppose that the magnitude of this diﬀerence is one
of the world records held by Finnish society. The pension system based on
support form the social partners was in a sense a natural agent for inter-
nalizing the costs of human capital depreciation, and early retirement leg-
islation was passed in the 1970s and 1980s.
At the beginning of the 1980s, the national pension scheme was thor-
oughly overhauled. Up until then, the beneﬁts had been means tested
against the total incomes of the beneﬁciaries. Since then, reform beneﬁts
have been means tested against the earnings-related pension beneﬁts.
The problem of an aging population has been well known, at least since
the beginning of the 1980s. The ﬁrst exhaustive, long-run social expendi-
ture projections had been presented in 1980 (Report of the Working Group
for Evaluating the Expenditures and Goals of Social Security 1980). A
mechanical projection based on a deterministic population forecast is still
the most popular method for approaching the problem of aging popula-
tions all over the world. Even with hindsight, one cannot ﬁnd the reason
that the issue of aging populations was not emphasized when the decisions
were made.
The Recent Past and Recent Future Projections
Lassila and Valkonen give a clear picture of the economic and demo-
graphic background, and of the nature and extent of the reforms in the
1990s.
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been nearly 5 percent, on average; the average real returns on the pension
funds have been even higher, at 7–8 percent, although pension institutions
have held low-risk portfolios. If the recent productivity growth rates and
rates of return were those of the stationary state of the economy, we would
not need to raise contribution rates by the year 2050 according to the base-
line population forecast, even if ever-increasing longevity were included.
Although the present contribution rate of 21.5 percent has not been an
obstacle to rapid growth, in the event of modest real returns we will have
to raise contribution rates. According to the projections of the Central
Pension Security Institute (Klaavo et al. 1999) as well as those of Lassila
and Valkonen (1999), a balanced path can be found with (for example) a
real return rate of 3 percent, a labor productivity growth rate of 1.5 per-
cent, and a contribution rate rising to 32 percent by the year 2050. The
risk is that the calculations underestimate the growth slowdown or the
political eﬀects of raising contribution rates, not to mention the risk in-
cluded in the population forecasts described by Lassila and Valkonen.
The funds’ rate of return has a crucial role to play in deﬁning the fund-
ing rate and thus the future contribution rates. The funds are run mainly
by private companies and foundations; investment decisions are made by
the portfolio managers of these institutions, while in the national accounts
the wealth of funds running statutory schemes is included in the general
government coﬀers. Finland is thus one of the very few countries in which
the net ﬁnancial wealth of the general government is positive. I expect
public net ﬁnancial wealth at the end of the year 2000 to be approximately
50 percent of the year’s gross domestic product (GDP). Generational ac-
counting with 1995 as the base year showed that the net intertemporal
liabilities of the Finnish general government were among the highest in
Europe, 2.50 times the 1995 GDP (Feist et al. 1999). Using the year 2000
as the base year, the net liabilities are no more than 1.25 times the 2000
GDP according to my estimate. The reasons behind the improvement are
forced saving to pension funds, high returns, expenditure cuts, and favor-
able economic development.
Advantages of a Mixed System
First, mixed decision making has worked well so far. The social partners
have designed the reforms, but the political decision makers have also ac-
cepted them and passed the laws. The prerequisite for the success of this
procedure is that both social partners have an interest in taking part in the
process. With respect to ﬁscal-policy decision making, the Finnish pension
system is also a mixed one. Both rules and discretionary decision making
have been present. Lassila and Valkonen propose to link beneﬁts or contri-
butions to longevity or fertility rates. These proposals give more weight to
rules compared with the present procedure, in which contribution rates
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and employers’ costs so that incentives to continue working are strong
enough.
Second, for several reasons there would not have been any opportunity
to accumulate wealth to cover the liabilities of the aging population if the
funds had been run by public institutions. It is very unlikely that political
decision makers could have resisted the temptation to raise present expen-
ditures or cut present taxes. Finally, it would have been unacceptable for
politicians or the authorities to manage such vast wealth.
Third, partial prefunding represents a kind of risk sharing, in which the
explicit part of the liabilities is covered by ﬁnancial capital and the implicit
part by human capital (i.e., by the PAYGO part of contributions). A mixed
strategy may be a good one, for example, when it is unclear whether the
beneﬁts of the “new economy” will materialize in human capital or ﬁnan-
cial capital returns.
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Discussion Summary
According to Horst Siebert, a remarkable feature of the Finnish pension
system is that social partners were able to build up a suﬃcient pension
fund and that they did not use the fund for their own purposes. He asked
whether there is any secret behind this outcome. Georges de Menil pointed
out in this respect that in 1956 the government took money from the pen-
288 Jukka Lassila and Tarmo Valkonension fund. He asked why this might not be a likely outcome again. Jukka
Lassila answered by noting that it is not easy to ﬁnd the secret behind
decision making in the Finnish pension system, because the process of
decision making is not clearly established but has come out of practice.
The Finnish system appears to be rather eﬀective right now, but a situation
like that in 1956 is not totally inconceivable. Lassila interpreted the Finn-
ish system as a division of labor between the political parties and the social
partners, in which decisions on the pension system are separated from
other political decisions. However, some kind of political consensus be-
tween the social partners and the main political parties is necessary in his
view. Reijo Vanne added that in the beginning of the reforms the social
partners did not want to rely on the state and tried to keep the state away
from the pension system. This may also explain why the social partners
made their decisions so rapidly, because they feared state intervention if
they did not come to an agreement.
Martin Feldstein inquired about the statement of the authors that the
pension system gave the trade unions more power. Feldstein wanted to
know in which sense this was true. Tarmo Valkonen responded that the
power of the social partners mainly results from the tripartite decision
making in the development of the pension system, and from the seats in
the administration of the pension institutes.
Laurence J. Kotlikoﬀ asked the discussant whether he has redone the
generational accounting for Finland recently and how the results have
changed. Reijo Vanne responded that the generational accounts have not
been redone yet, but his preliminary guess is that the true public debt
including social security has declined from 2.5 times the GDP in 1995 to
1.5 times the GDP in 2000.
A. Lans Bovenberg asked whether there is any evidence for Finland that
low income earners are supplying less labor as a consequence of means
testing. He regarded this as an important issue, because there is a great
deal of pressure in many countries to target pension funds to lower income
levels, and the key question is whether this leads to more distortions. In
his answer, Jukka Lassila noted that most people do not understand the
workings of the pension system, so that the labor supply disincentives re-
sulting from the integration of the national pensions into the earnings-
related pensions are probably not very high. However, the disincentive
eﬀects will be more important if people become aware of the high marginal
tax eﬀects of the pensions. He added that work incentives for low-income
earners are generally very low, because many transfer systems are means
tested and have high marginal tax rates of more than 100 percent in
some cases.
A. Lans Bovenberg wondered whether the public in Finland is concerned
about the increasing level of equity investments of pension funds, because
this might lead to problems of politicization of the equity holdings. Assar
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cent of the Finnish stock market so that their inﬂuence should be rather
small. Jukka Lassila added that the increasing share of equity holdings of
Finnish pension funds results from the increases in the prices of the equi-
ties and not from new investments in equities. In addition, a large part of
equity holdings of the pension funds is held in foreign stocks. Tarmo Valko-
nen emphasized the importance of investments in new information tech-
nologies, which have yielded a great deal in Finland. According to Reijo
Vanne, the pension funds follow a strategy of passive portfolio investing
rather than strategic investing, so that their inﬂuence in the economy is
also limited by this fact.
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